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INTRODUCTION
Professors Alan Mislove and Christo Wilson wanted to test a number
of housing and employment website algorithms for the presence of hidden
* Yale Law School, J.D. 2018; University of Pennsylvania, B.A., 2013. I am
grateful to Professor Frederick Lawrence for his feedback on early drafts of
this Comment Many thanks to Jacob van Leer, Stephanie Garlock, and Simon
Zhen at the Yale Law & Policy Review for their insightful comments and
careful editing. All errors are mine alone.
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discrimination.' While algorithms do not have any predisposition against
any group, faulty programming can create deplorable discriminatory
effects.2 Without testing, it can be difficult to tell which algorithms
discriminate and on what grounds. Mislove and Wilson devised an "audit
testing" model where researchers designed the profiles of two groups of
paired individuals that are equally qualified in the market being studied.'
Under the "audit testing" model, one group consists of legally-protected
minority members, and the other consists of individuals without those
minority characteristics.4 Mislove and Wilson thought the same method
could work to test online discrimination: by observing the website's
treatment of each individual's advertisements and application success, the
researchers could assess whether the minority group received
systematically inferior treatment.5
However, Mislove and Wilson quickly ran into a big problem:
conducting their online research might violate the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The CFAA criminalizes a person's
behavior when he or she "intentionally accesses a computer without
1. See Adam Weintraub, 'Landlords Needed, Tolerance Preferred" A Clash of
Fairness and Freedom in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 54 VILL. L.
REV. 337, 338 (2009) (describing "housing discrimination through the use
of online housing advertising"); see also Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping
While Black: Applying 42 US Cf 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling,
23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 55 n.259 (2003) ("Testing by the Equal Rights
Center in Washington, D.C. revealed that consumer racism exists in
cyberspace too.").
2. For example, a study demonstrated that an algorithmic software deployed in
the criminal justice context had significant racial biases when accounting for
criminal risk. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23,
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-
in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/WX7K-N65P].
3. John Yinger, Audits for Discrimination, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (William A. Darity, Jr., ed., 2d ed. 2007).
4. Id.
5. Id. The offline analog involves researchers posing as members of different
groups to test for bias in the job and housing markets. See Daniella Kehl,
Sandvig v. Lynch: ACLU Challenges Constitutionality of CFAA Provision That
Threatens Online Discrimination Research, JOLT DIGEST, HARV. J. L. & TECH.
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authorization or exceeds authorized access."6 If the targeted websites
conditioned access on truthful disclosures of personal information, any
fake user profile would violate the website's terms and conditions and
would arguably amount to "unauthorized access" under the CFAA. In
response, Mislove and Wilson preemptively challenged the
constitutionality of the CFAA.
This Comment addresses the CFAA's potentially stifling effects on
important academic research and explores academics' violations of a
website's access conditions through deceptive consent. Scant scholarship
has explored academic deception in the online context,8 and no previous
work has considered academic freedom arguments within light of the
CFAA. After identifying the "line" where violations of website terms of
agreement likely transgress the CFAA, this Comment argues that
researchers should receive greater latitude under the CFAA to obtain
deceptive consent for website access. The Comment analogizes the
interests in academic investigation to those in law enforcement operations
and further contends that public university researchers, like government
law enforcement agents, should be able to obtain valid consent through
misrepresentation in limited circumstances. The Comment concludes that,
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2018). SeeMusacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709,
713 (2016) (noting that the CFAA "provides two ways of committing the
crime of improperly accessing a protected computer: (1) obtaining access
without authorization; and (2) obtaining access with authorization but then
using that access improperly").
7. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 37, Sandvig v. Sessions,
315 F. Supp 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01368) ("The freedom to
conduct academic research... [is] of paramount public importance and
entitled to full protection under the First Amendment."). See Kim Zetter,
Researchers Sue the Government Over Computer Hacking Law WIRED (June
29, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/researchers-sue-
government-computer-hacking-law [https://perma.cc/W29R-34BA].
8. For recent scholarship on academic deception in the digital context, see
Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online
Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1231-32 (2017), which describes the
CFAA's potential chilling effect on online academic research; Komal S. Patel,
Testing the Limits of the First Amendment: How Online Civil Rights Testing
Is Protected Speech Activity 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (2018); and Bradley
Williams, Preventing Unintended Internet Discrimination: An Analysis of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Algorithmic Racial Steering 2 018 U. ILL.
L. REV. 847 (2018).
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under limited conditions, academic researchers may achieve valid consent
through behavior that might otherwise amount to willful code-based
violations of a website's terms of service.
I. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
When Congress passed the CFAA, it enacted an intentionally broad
statute criminalizing computer hacking. The CFAA prohibits both
unauthorized use and activities that "exceed authorized use,"9 and many
commentators have expressed concerns that the expansive language
regulates constitutionally protected activities that go far beyond computer
hacking.10
In United States v. Nosal ("Nosal I'), the Ninth Circuit noted that
"Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to address the growing
problem of computer hacking."" Both the government and the defendant
agreed that the CFAA targets computer hacking, but disagreed as to the
scope of the criminal prohibition on unauthorized use.12 In NOsal I, Judge
Kozinski warned that on its face, the CFAA's criminalization can reach as
far as "g-chatting with friends, playing games, shopping or watching sports
highlights."1 3 As a result, the court applied the rule of lenity and defined
"exceeds authorized access" as limited to violations of access restrictions
and to not include use restrictions.1 4
At least one court has held that, in terms of the creation of a
misdemeanor offense for an intentional violation of a website's terms of
service, the CFAA is void for vagueness.5 However, the Ninth Circuit
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
10. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act 94 MINN. L. REv. 1561, 1563 (2010) ("The CFAA has become too
broad to apply without careful attention to the vagueness doctrine.");
Jonathan Mayer, The "Narrow" Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and
AbuseAct: A User Guide for Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1644, 1670 (2016) (offering a narrow interpretation of the CFAA to
combat the CFAA's "ambiguous and broad" statutory text).
11. 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 860.
14. Id. at 863-64.
15. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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sitting en banc in Nosal II held that the CFAA's meaning of "without
authorization" had an unambiguous plain meaning and therefore refused
to find the CFAA void for vagueness.'"
A. PublicAccess
Since Nosal l1, courts and scholars have agreed that merely accessing a
public website, even when transgressing the website's terms of service,
does not amount to a violation of the CFAA. Otherwise, the CFAA would
create expansive criminal liability. For example, a website could forbid the
use of a Virtual Private Network ("VPN"), and every visitor who opened
the page while using a VPN would have committed a federal crime.
Leading computer crime expert Orin Kerr analogizes access to a public
website as akin to visiting a storefront:
You can approach the store and peer through the window. If you
see no one inside, you can try to enter through the front door. If
the door is unlocked, you can enter the store and walk around. The
shared understanding is that shop owners are normally open to
potential customers.'7
In a recent decision, a federal district court relied upon Kerr's analysis.
In hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn, the court distinguished prior unauthorized use
cases under the CFAA from cases that involved access to "public data." 8
The court rejected as absurd the notion that "merely viewing a website in
contravention of a unilateral directive from a private entity would be a
crime, effectuating the digital equivalence of Medusa."19 Noting that the
CFAA was "not intended to police traffic to publicly available websites on
the Internet," the court limited 'unauthorized access' to include only
instances where the website has imposed a password authentication
16. United States v. Nosal ("Nosal IT), 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016), cert
denied, 138 S. Ct 314 (2017).
17. Orin S. Kerr, Essay, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 1143,
1151 (2016).
18. 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ("Each of these cases is
distinguishable in an important respect: none of the data in
Facebookor Nosal Iwas public data.").
19. Id. at 1110.
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system to regulate access.20 Thus, under hiQ Labs, online researchers
could freely misrepresent information on public access websites.
B. Anyone Can Register
However, researchers might face a website that requires password
authentication but is open to all through free registration. At first glance,
dicta in hiQ Labs suggests that this sort of "password authentication
system to regulate access" would be protected under the CFAA. However,
Orin Kerr, whose scholarship the hiQ Labs court cites, argues that "[w]hen
anyone can open an account, there is an implicit delegation to anyone who
registers for a new account."21 According to Kerr, in the context of public
websites, the grant of website access authorizes account use for any
reason. Thus, researchers should be able to use a website to create
misleading and even false profiles where anyone can open an account.
This presumption of access should override most embedded terms of
use phrased as access restrictions. Put otherwise, the mere presence of
terms of access within a website's "terms and conditions" page should not
be considered access restrictions. As Kerr points out, "terms of use may be
drafted by lawyers to read like limitations on access. But companies do not
actually expect the many visitors to otherwise-public websites to comply
with the terms by keeping themselves out."2 2 The Ninth Circuit has
affirmed Kerr's view, holding that the "violation of the terms of use of a
website-without more-cannot be the basis for liability under the
CFAA." 23 One might justify this presumption through a notification model
that emphasizes the defendant's intent to knowingly disregard clear access
20. Id. at 1109-12. Orin Kerr argues that "[t]he authorization line should be
deemed crossed only when access is gained by bypassing an authentication
requirement." Kerr, supra note 17, at 1161.
21. Kerr, supra note 17 at 1177.
22. Id. at 1165-66.
23. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016);
see Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Several Members of Congress also attempted to prevent a breach of contract
from becoming a criminal violation through Aaron's Law, H.R. 2454, 113th
Cong. § 4; S. 1196, 113th Cong. § 4. However, the bill died in committee. See
Tiffany Curtiss, Computer Fraud andAbuse Act Enforcement: Cruel, Unusual,
and Due for Reform, 91 WASH. L. REv. 1813, 1833 (2016).
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limitations.2 4 Under such a test, intentional misrepresentation would only
amount to an unauthorized access if a website explicitly notified those
creating fake profiles of a requirement that all accounts must contain
accurate information.
C Willful Violation
A more challenging case for deceptive online research concerns those
cases where the website does not permit unrestricted access and the
defendant intentionally violated those access restrictions through a
"violation of code."2 5 Consider, for example, a website that does not permit
users under the age of twenty-one and requires registrants to fill in their
birthdate. Suppose that the website's code denies registration to those
who input birth dates that do not meet the minimum age requirements. Or,
for the case most relevant for online discrimination researchers, the
website might require that users provide truthful information upon
registration. For example, Airbnb.com verifies profiles through the use of
government-issued driver's licenses and passports. Such access
restrictions can be analogized to entrance into a bar. While bars are public
establishments, most will not allow access without proof of age.
Under the norms proposed by Orin Kerr and the standards articulated
by the hiQ Labs court, willful deception of this kind would amount to
unauthorized access in violation of the CFAA.26 Here, the distinction
between general terms of agreement and clear registration requirements
24. See Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of
Hacking 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1490-91 (2016) ("So long as there is
sufficient proof that this notification reached the defendant, and that the
defendant read it or otherwise knew of the access limitation it conveyed, the
defendant's access contrary to these limitations was unauthorized.").
25. Ryan H. Niland, Do Not Read this Aricle at Work: The CFAA's Vagueness
Problem and Recent Legislative Attempts to Correct It 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
205, 220 (2014); Danielle E. Sunberg, Reining in the Rogue Employee: The
Fourth Circuit Limits Employee Liability Under the CFAA, 62 AM. U. L. REV.
1417, 1429 (2013).
26. Kerr, supra note 17, at 1171 ("Authentication requirements should be
understood as the basic requirement of a trespass-triggering barrier on the
Web. By limiting access to a specific person or group, the authentication
requirement imposes a barrier that overrides the Web default of open
access.").
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is an important one. The Second Circuit has interpreted the standard for
legal enforceability of online contracts to turn on "whether a reasonably
prudent offeree" would be on notice of the term at issue.27 When terms of
service are found to be otherwise enforceable, the Supreme Court has been
reticent to invalidate them on First Amendment grounds. For example,
when a newspaper breached an agreement protecting the anonymity of a
source, the Supreme Court found that "the First Amendment does not
confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises that would
otherwise be enforced under state law."2 8 Under this logic, a researcher
would not be able to breach the terms of a legally enforceable agreement
governing the terms of use for a website. However, as I argue below, under
limited circumstances, even violations of code-based restrictions should
confer effective access consent and not amount to a violation of the CFAA.
II. PERMITTING CODE-BASED VIOLATIONS: INVESTIGATIVE MISREPRESENTATIONS
Courts should not read the CFAA to criminalize all false
misrepresentations made in furtherance of academic research. Courts will
sometimes deem fraudulent misrepresentations to effectuate valid
consent. While the body of law remains unsettled, I argue that academic
researchers, like other government investigators, should have a limited
right to secure access consent through deceptive tactics. Thus, I contend
that there should be circumstances under which courts will find that even
willful violations of online access conditions do not constitute
"unauthorized access" under the CFAA.
A. Deception Does Not Necessarily Invalidate Consent
In situations in which a website has bona fide access restrictions,
academic researchers might willfully violate that site's terms of use. But
even where the researchers intend to knowingly deceive website owners,
traditional trespass case law suggests that access terms alone should not
27. Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236 (2d Cir. 2016). The First
Circuit has adopted a similar test, noting that "[r]easonably conspicuous
notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of
assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is
to have integrity and credibility." Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53,
61 (1st Cir. 2018).
28. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
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prevent online researchers from engaging in misrepresentation. The
"online audits" can be analogized to the legitimate deception that occurs in
"real world" audit testing. In Desnick v American Broadcasting Company
undercover television reporters carried hidden cameras into eye
examination centers, after promising the property owner that they would
not engage in undercover reporting.29 Desnick explicitly relies on the
notion that "'[t]esters' who pose as prospective home buyers in order to
gather evidence of housing discrimination are not trespassers even if they
are private persons not acting under color of law."0 The court grounds its
decision in the parallel between discrimination testing and the ability for
government agents to accept an invitation to do business and to enter
upon the premises for "the very purposes contemplated by the occupant"
during the course of an investigation.' Importantly for Desnick the
defendant's videotaping actions did not intrude upon "any of the specific
interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect."3 2 While the line
between those cases where deceit vitiates intent and those where it does
not may be "fine and sometimes incoherent," the precedent establishes
that under some circumstances, deception does not invalidate consent.33
Courts have been very permissive in allowing government agents to
obtain valid consent based on misrepresentations.3 4 In Hoffa v. United
States, the Supreme Court found that an individual secretly operating as a
government informant did not negate the informant's consent to be in
another individual's hotel room.35 Similarly, in Lewis v. United States, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of covert information
gathering, ruling that an undercover government agent disguised as a
willing purchaser of illegal drugs received lawful consent to enter the
dealer's home. The Court held that "the Government is entitled to use
29. 44 F.3d 1345, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995).
30. Id. at 1353.
31. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Northside Realty
Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1355 (5th Cir. 1979).
32. Desnick 44 F.3d at 1352.
33. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004).
34. See Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy 19 YALE J.L. &TECH. 238, 252 (2017).
35. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
36. 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966).
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decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents," and to hold otherwise
would "severely hamper the Government."3 7
Courts have recognized undercover research as a legitimate means of
gathering information. "Undercover work is a legitimate method of
discovering violations of civil as well as criminal law."3" Unless undercover
agents could deceitfully disavow their associations, covert operations
would be meaningless.39 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
the government's interest in being able to utilize government deception
and has overturned legal constructions that might "potentially threate[n]
the use of properly run law enforcement sting operations."4 0
B. Academic Researchers as Government Investigators
Academics at public universities conducting deceptive online research
should be viewed akin to government investigators for the purpose of
deceptive consent.41 Just as the government has a strong interest in
ensuring that police can investigate crime, the government also has a deep
interest in promoting academic research. When state-employed academic
researchers engage in deceptive online research, they act in a capacity as
government agents.
1. Deep Interest in Promoting Academic Research
The Court has long emphasized the significant government interest in
academic freedom. The Court has suggested a special government interest
in academic freedom as an integral means of protecting general societal
welfare. Academic repression poses a high-stakes risk: "absent the
academic freedom to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
37. Id. at 209-10.
38. United States v. Centennial Builders, Inc., 747 F.2d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. ("A contrary position would enable individuals suspected of crimes to
negate the effects of undercover investigations merely by inquiring of all
associates at the outset whether they are government agents.").
40. United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 276 (2003).
41. In following this analogy, this Comment adopts Grimmelman's approach that
"'[a]uthorization' under the CFAA is best understood as incorporating the
traditional legal understanding of consent...." James Grimmelmann,
Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1500, 1521 (2016).
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maturity and understanding ... our civilization will stagnate and die."42
The Supreme Court continued to stress the critical importance of academic
freedom as "so fundamental to the functioning of our society,"'* but the
Court did not clarify the legal status of this valuable concept. Assessed
holistically, "[t]he Court has been far more generous in its praise of
academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its meaning."4 4
The Supreme Court has never formally recognized a constitutional
right to academic research distinct from general free speech protections.
The Court has, however, repeatedly recognized the important
constitutional interests raised by academic freedom. In Kevishian v. Board
of Regents, the Supreme Court declared that academic freedom "is of
transcendent value to all of us" and "a special concern of the First
Amendment.4 5 Similarly, Justice Powell's majority opinion in Bakke
declared that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment."4 6 More recently, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed
that "[w]e have long recognized that, given the important purpose of
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special
42. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); see also JoNel Newman,
Will Teachers Shed Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate?
The Eleventh Circuit's Post-Garcetti Jurisprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 761,
763-65 (2009) (tracing the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
academic freedom).
43. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("[T]he university is... so
fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability
to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment") (citation omitted); see also
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (identifying academic
freedom as a "transcendent value" and a "special concern of the First
Amendment").
44. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of The First
Amendment "99 YALE L.J. 251, 257 (1989).
45. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that that academic freedom is
central to "the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to
protect.").
46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
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niche in our constitutional tradition.""7 But "[d]espite the Court's many
pronouncements hinting at such an individual right, no decision of the
Court has depended for its resolution on the existence of such a right."48 In
fact, several circuit and district court decisions considering academic
freedom have ruled against an individual right to research and
scholarship.4 9
Nevertheless, recent case law suggests that some appellate courts are
willing to recognize a distinct constitutional right to academic freedom for
state-employed university academics. In Demers v. Austin, the Ninth
Circuit appeared to find a special First Amendment right to faculty
speech.50 The Demers court read the Keyishian language that academic
freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment" to distinguish
between the speech of academic employees and other public employees-
granting special First Amendment consideration to the academic speech of
the former. Citing the Fourth Circuit's decision in Adams v. Trustees of the
University of N.C-Wilmingtonst as precedent,52 Demers created a circuit
split by answering in the affirmative the unsettled question of whether
academic freedom constituted a separate and individual right.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos suggests
uncertainty amongst the Court's majority as to whether expression related
to academic scholarship implicates a distinct constitutional interest. The
Ceballos majority recognized that expression related to academic
scholarship might implicate additional constitutional interests not fully
accounted for by the Supreme Court's customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.5 3 The jury is still out over whether the Supreme Court will
47. 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
48. Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of The
FirstAmendment 83 Miss. L.J. 677, 679 (2014).
49. See Borden v. Sch. Dist of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008);
Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 545
F.3d 4, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Johnson-Kurekv. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 593
(6th Cir. 2005); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 404-05 (4th Cir. 2000);
Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 216 (D. Conn. 2005).
50. 746 F.3d 402, 411-12 (9th Cir. 2014).
51. 640 F.3d 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2011).
52. See Demers, 746 F.3d at 411.
53. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
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agree with Demers and find a constitutional right for individual academics
to speak on matters of public concern.
Regardless of the constitutional determination over a distinct
individual right for academic freedom, the long line of case law evinces a
profound governmental interest in promoting and developing academic
ideas. The consistent judicial homage to academic freedom's "special niche
in our constitutional tradition" reflects a fundamental understanding of
the critical importance of the free flow of information and the pursuit of
research to the maintenance of a healthy society.5 4 While academic
freedom operates as a protection against government interference with
the development of knowledge through a flourishing marketplace of ideas,
the special protection afforded to academic freedom simultaneously
affirms the government's extraordinary interest in furthering that
selfsame knowledge through protecting academic research. Thus, the
longstanding constitutional tradition protecting academic freedom reflects
a deep-seated state interest in the furtherance of academic research.
2. Academics As Government Agents
Academic researchers at public universities conduct their research in
an official capacity and should receive the same endorsement for deceptive
investigative tactics granted to government agents.55 Faculty members
employed by public schools are public employeeS.5 6 In Garcetti v. Ceballos,
the Supreme Court ruled that public employees may only receive First
Amendment protection when they speak in their capacity as private
citizens and not as part of their job duties as an employee.5 7 Given that
public university professors "necessarily speak and write "pursuant to...
[their] official duties,"58 Garcetti threatened to impliedly wipe out First
54. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
55. This claim does not preclude finding similar interests in other contexts, such
as news reporting.
56. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979)
(discussing the First Amendment rights of school teachers as public
employees).
57. Garcetti 547 U.S. 410.
58. Id at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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Amendment protection for public-school faculty.59 The Garcetti majority
recognized the threat to faculty researchers in dicta.60 While Garcetti left
open the question of whether academic freedom changes the public
employee speech calculus, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion clearly
situates faculty researchers as government employees.
When government employees speak pursuant to their official duties,
they function as agents of their government employer.6 ' As the Garcetti
majority propounded, "[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a
public employee's professional responsibilities ... simply reflects the
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created."62 In other words, "[t]he majority accepts ...
that any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or
should be treated as) the government's own speech."63
Academic faculty members conduct their research pursuant to their
official duties. Most standard faculty positions include as expected duties
teaching, research, and service.6 4 As such, when those faculty members
59. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and
§ 1983A Critique ofGarcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 561, 563 (2008);
see also Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
faculty research to constitute employee-not private-speech); Bridget R.
Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing Academic Freedom from Garcetti v.
Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and a Proposal for the
Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. &
U.L. 115, 136 (2014) ("While the Seventh Circuit was averse to applying the
Garcetti rule to the academically-unrelated classroom speech in Pggee, the
Renken court applied the Garcetti rule to activity related to scholarship.").
60. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) ("There is some argument
that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests.... We need not, and for that
reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in




63. Id. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. See Jammie Price & Shelia R. Cotten, Teaching Research, and Service:
Expectations of Assistant Professors, 37 Am. SOCIOLOGIST 5 (2006); Colleen
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conduct their research pursuant to those required duties of their position,
they engage as government agents expressing government speech. Thus,
when academic researchers at public universities undertake research
projects, they act as government employees assigned to augment society's
collective knowledge-occasionally through online research tactics.65
Academic researchers at public universities should enjoy a similar but
limited right to deceptive consent as granted to covert government agents.
As detailed in Part 0, courts permit government agents to obtain valid
consent based on misrepresentation because of the government's
legitimate interest in employing such tactics to ferret out criminal activity,
and the fact that disclosure would render such operations meaningless.
Here, public university faculty members conduct their research as agents
of the government, and their pursuit of academic freedom represents a
core state interest. As with government agents seeking to uncover criminal
activity, academic researchers seeking to engage in studies like audit
testing for hidden discrimination are required to engage in some
misrepresentation. Like their criminal investigative counterparts, the
disclosure of academic researchers' identities within research settings
requiring misrepresentation would severely hamper their ability to
effectively further the important state interest of academic research.
Therefore, academic researchers serving as government agents should
[https://perma.cc/5U9Q-9J47]; see, e.g., Assistant Professor, UNIV. KAN.,
https://employment.ku.edu/assistant-professor/12412br
[https://perma.cc/47YC-GNG5] (describing standard workload expectation
as forty percent teaching, forty percent research, and twenty percent
service).
65. While this analysis applies most directly to academic faculty at state
universities, it can arguably extend to all academic researchers that receive
government grants to pursue their research. The Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on "government action" for the purposes of a search may
prove instructive in this regard. In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649
(1980), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the same Fourth Amendment
limitations applied to "any official use of a private party's invasion of another
person's privacy," because the private party acted as an instrument or agent
of the state. 447 U.S. at 657. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
487 (1971). Similarly, private academics conducting research projects
pursuant to academic research grants might be considered instruments of
the state entrusted with the furthering the government interest in academic
discovery.
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receive the same ability to obtain valid consent hrough misrepresentation
as their law enforcement counterparts.
C Extending the Deceptive Consent Exception
For many public websites with code-based restrictions, transforming
the terms of service to code-based access restrictions should not destroy
the availability of consent obtained through misrepresentation. Instead,
the traditional deceptive consent theories of tort and criminal procedure
should carry over to the CFAA criminal statutory analysis. In the law
enforcement context, agents may only "accept an invitation to do business
and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by
the occupant."6  When terms of service become code-based access
restrictions that otherwise permit open access, courts should apply the
deceptive consent doctrine to find "authorized access" under the CFAA.67 A
limited class of cases where researchers obtain access pursuant to
deceptive misrepresentation should not operate as trespass (carrying
criminal implications) but should instead be construed as access pursuant
to legitimately authorized consent.
Critically, consent must remain the touchstone of the analysis.
Maintaining consent as a required element tethers the consent exception
to a limited set of circumstances. Consent also helps maintain the well-
reasoned rule that public concern does not justify the unlawful gathering
of information.6 8 Even the presence of substantial public interest in
discovering private information does not justify unlawful investigation
methods conducted without consent.
66. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
67. Note that if an academic researcher transgresses beyond the outer bounds of
acceptable consent, the researcher would still face civil liability for breach of
contract or trespass.
68. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001); see also Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11, (1978) ("There is an undoubted right to gather
news 'from any source by means within the law,' but that affords no basis for
the claim that the First Amendment compels others-private persons or
governments-to supply information."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
691 (1972) ("It would be frivolous to assert-and no one does in these
cases-that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or
otherwise, confers a license... to violate valid criminal laws."); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.").
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Opponents might argue that disambiguating the edge of acceptable
deceptive practices for obtaining consent poses a tall order. To be sure, the
Ninth Circuit provides the somewhat cryptic test of whether the "invited
mistakes go to the essential nature of the invasion [or] are merely
collateral."6 9 The comments to the Restatement of Torts reframe the test in
similarly ill-defined tests: "[i]f the consent is induced by mistake
concerning other matters, the rule [invalidating consent] does not
apply."70 Against this context, James Grimmelman's "imputed consent" test
offers a helpful framework for considering the extent of acceptable
deceptive practices. Courts entertain the legal fiction of "imputed
consent" in order to achieve the associated desirable consequences.72
The investigative exception for "imputed consent" to code-based
restrictions should operate on two limiting principles. First, the scope of
this exception should be limited.to deceptive misrepresentation to secure
consent for online access. This exception should not purport to operate
beyond the trespass-access context. Second, the exception should forbid
the impersonation of authorized persons, at least without the consent of
those authorized persons, and should instead require the use of a fictitious
persona. This limiting principle serves to enforce the collateral-essential
distinction outlined by the Ninth Circuit. If a discrete and bounded number
of individuals has authorization to access a website, then the individual's
distinct identity plays an essential factor in securing access. In contrast, if
the code-based restriction allows entrance for false aliases-even if
limited to a specific group-then the misrepresented identity cannot be
fundamentally based on that individual's unique identity.7 ' While these
principles map rough boundaries for the deceptive consent exception,
69. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. g (1979).
71. Grimmelmann, supra note 42, at 1515.
72. Id.
73. One may conceptualize this distinguishing principle as resting on a form of
property interest-when the website owner grants the unbounded group of
qualified individuals who meet certain criteria the right to access the site,
then that unbounded sub-group receives a presumptive claim of entitlement
to access. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (defining
property interests as "existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source"). If an investigator may create a fictitious persona and
gain access, then they face a lower bar to access-a hurdle overcome with
the help of the compelling state interest
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Grimmelman rightly points out that hammering out the specific
boundaries of consent in the computer use space will only arise after
extensive judicial engagement with individual factual patterns.74 In all,
extending the deceptive consent exception to some academic
investigations would best empower judges to effectuate the important
interests enshrined in academic freedom.
CONCLUSION
Courts should not interpret the CFAA to criminalize academic research
activities resulting from deceptive consent. Academic researchers at public
universities, like other government investigators, should have the limited
right to engage in deceptive tactics. Government agents have traditionally
enjoyed the leeway to obtain valid access consent based on
misrepresentation. Courts have permitted such misrepresentation because
of the significant government interest in uncovering criminal activity. Like
government agents, academic researchers investigative activities
represent the pursuit of an important government interest in academic
research. As a result, courts should sometimes deem willful
misrepresentations by academic to validly effectuate consent.
The lack of a clear line for deceptive online research weighs against
applying the CFAA to online academic research. The CFAA has an
ambiguous reach to deceptive online academic research, and the
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity."7 6 Not only are courts concerned with a fair warning
requirement," but vague statutes also present the risk that they "may in
[themselves] deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable
conduct."7 Under the CFAA, researchers would likely retreat from
74. See Grimmelmann, supra note 42, at 1521-22.
75. Admittedly, this analogous treatment of academic and government
investigations has wide ranging implications beyond the CFAA context and
presents a ripe area for further research and scholarship.
76. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015).
77. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ("[I]t is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line
is passed.").
78. United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963); see also J.
Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real
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exercising the full gamut of their rights due to a desire to avoid
inadvertently crossing the uncertain boundaries.79 Instead, researchers
would restrict their scholarship to activity that is unquestionably
permitted-such as non-deceptive research. The migration to "safe
behavior" leads to the fear that the vague statutory language will quash
socially desirable activity such as academic research on hidden
discrimination. The First Amendment demands that statutory language
"must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only
unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
expression."80 This need for "extreme caution" in criminalizing protected
activity is only magnified when confronting the Internet, where "we cannot
appreciate yet i s full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think,
express ourselves, and define who we want to be."81 As such, construction
of the CFAA should create a clear line permitting some willful
circumvention of code-based restrictions. By recognizing the importance
of academic investigations, courts can assimilate online technologies and
maintain America's timeless commitment to vital academic research.
About the "Four Freedoms" of a University 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 944
(2006) ("[V]ague and overbroad statutes will inhibit exercise of important
freedoms.").
79. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964) (noting that a vague loyalty
oath forbidding support of "subversive organizations" such as the
Communist party may chill constitutionally protected speech, including
political support for Communist political candidates).
80. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
81. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
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